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. INTRODUCTION
Multidistrict litigation (MDL) includes some of the most high-profile torts
of our day-opioids, talc, and RoundUp, to name a few-but the attorneys who
spearhead these proceedings often look a lot like they did fifty years ago,
predominately white and predominately male. Courts seem to be missing what
businesses, academics, and civil-rights lawyers have long argued: the case for
diversity is multi-faceted. As the Wall Street Journalexplained: "There is a moral
case for diversity and inclusion. And there's a business case: long-term value is
tied to diversity and diversity is tied to innovation. But the last few years have told
us there is a democracy case, too."'
Picking the right lawyers to spearhead these proceedings on plaintiffs'
behalf is pivotal. Those who preside over and work within MDL must grapple with
some of the most pressing, complicated legal problems of our time-from cuttingedge decisions about scientific causation to federal preemption to novel
applications of centuries-old public-nuisance doctrines. These questions are
difficult not just because they are novel, but because they affect thousands of
plaintiffs too. Moreover, because MDL requires only a single common factual
question-not that common issues predominate as in a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action-plaintiffs' interests and goals are likely to be heterogeneous.
But a debate has emerged over whether attorneys best positioned to fill
MDL leadership roles are the grizzled repeat players who appear time and againand who are largely white, older, and male-or newcomers with fresh ideas and
energy who may not always look like their predecessors.2 And if diversity is
important-what kind of diversity matters?
For most, "diversity" brings to mind category or identity diversity, which
includes race, ethnicity, age, gender, physical disabilities, and demographic
dissimilarities.3 Historically, little identity diversity has existed among the
regulars selected as MDL leaders: in 2015, only eleven of the top fifty repeat

* Fuller E. Callaway Chair of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
Lauren Weber, How to Expand Diversity in the Workplace, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2021, 9:56AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-expand-diversity-in-the-workplace-

11610204183?st=fvkwfieyx3rxc25&reflink=article_email_share.
2 Compare Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in MultidistrictLitigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67
(2017) (advocating for cognitively diverse newcomers) [hereinafter Burch, Monopolies in MDL
Litigation], with Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, It's Good to Have the "Haves" on Your

Side: A Defense of Repeat Players in MultidistrictLitigation, 108 GEo. L.J. 73 (2019).
3 Eden B. King et al., Conflict and Cooperationin Diverse Workgroups, 65 J. Soc. ISSUEs 261, 26768 (2009); K.A. Jehn et al., Why Differences Make a Difference: A FieldStudy of Diversity, Conflict,
andPerformance in Work Groups, 44 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 741 (1999); Elizabeth Mannix & Margaret A.
Neale, What Differences Make a Difference?: The Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in
Organizations,6 AM. PSYCHOL.

Soc' Y 31, 41-42(2005).
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players in MDL leadership were women (22%).4 The years since have seen some
improvement-in 2020, 40% of the top thirty lawyers who led three or more MDLs
were women.5
Judges, too, tend to think of diversity in terms of demographics.6 For
instance, in July 2020, Judge James Donato made headlines when considering
appointments for securities class counsel, saying:
This Court is concerned about a lack of diversity in the proposed lead
counsel. For example, all four of the proposed lead counsel are men,
which is also true for the proposed seven lawyers for the "executive
committee" and liaison counsel. In addition, the proposed counsel appear
to be lawyers and law firms that have enjoyed a number of leadership
appointments in other cases. While this experience is likely to benefit the
putative class, it highlights the "repeat player" problem in class counsel
appointments that has burdened class action litigation and MDL
proceedings.7

Yet, when Judge Harold Baer, Jr. instituted diversity requirements in selecting
ERISA class counsel, Justice Alito issued a rare opinion to deny a writ of certiorari,
calling into question the constitutionality of Baer's practices:
I am hard-pressed to see any ground on which Judge Baer's practice can
be defended. This Court has often stressed that "[r]acial discrimination
has no place in the courtroom, whether the proceeding is civil or
criminal." Court-approved discrimination based on gender is similarly
objectionable, and therefore it is doubtful that the practice in question
could survive a constitutional challenge.'

Although the issue of diversity in counsel selection was not squarely before the
Court, Justice Alito's rebuke nonetheless raises important questions about how
judges should navigate diversity in leadership selection, both in nonclass MDLs
JudgingMultidistrictLitigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REv. 71,93 n.102 (2015)
[hereinafter Burch, Judging MDL Litigation].
5 Amanda Bronstad, There Are New FacesLeading MDLs. And They Aren't All Men, LAW.COM (July
6, 2020, 10:53 PM), https:/www.law.com/2020/07/06/there-are-new-faces-leading-mdls-and-theyarent-all-men/?slreturn=20200915192502.
6 See, e.g., Pretrial Order #20 at 3, In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 9:20-md-2924
(S.D. Fl. May 8, 2020) (hoping that the selected Zantac MDL leaders would "endeavor to build on
4 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,

the diversity of its team"); Ralph Chapoco, Calls for Lawyer Diversity Spread to Complex Class
Litigation, BLOOMBERG L. (July 30, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/social-justice/calls-forlawyer-diversity-spread-to-complex-class-litigation; Alison Frankel, Judge in Robinhood Class
Action Balks at All-Male Class Counsel Team, REUTERS,. July
15, 2020,

https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-diversity/judge-in-robinhood-class-action-balks-at-allmale-class-counsel-team-idUSKCN24G324; Alison Frankel, Quoting Lorax and Noting Diversity,
N. Y. Judge Appoints Lead Counsel in Deva ProductCase, REUTERS, July 30, 2020.
' Order re Consolidation and Interim Class Counsel at 3, In re Robinhood Outage Litig., No. 20-cv01626-JD (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2020) (internal citations omitted).
8 Martin v. Blessing, 572 U.S. 1040, 1042 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
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without firm rules to guide them and in class actions where Rule 23(g) allows
. . matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class."9
This article counsels judges caught in the middle. By broadening the
definition of diversity and focusing the inquiry on a single, pivotal question-how
can a plaintiffs' MDL leadership best represent a heterogeneous group of
plaintiffs?-courts can navigate this quandary and put the best leadership team in
place.
Part I surveys current leadership selection methods and highlights
shortcomings in courts' focus on experience, cooperation, and financing abilities,
which tend to empower the same attorneys time and again. Part II explains the
debate over the "repeat player problem" that Judge Donato identified.' 0 Although
repeat players bring expertise and knowledge, the tight-knit nature of the MDL bar
and the emphasis on cooperation suggest that insiders are unlikely to dissent even
when doing so would be in their clients' best interests. It also means that attorney
self-dealing may be ignored. Finally, Part III suggests some best practices: courts
should consider conflicts of interest that are likely to emerge between plaintiffs
and plaintiffs' counsel, encourage dissent and the airing of minority viewpoints,
and select leaders based on attorneys' cognitive diversity-meaning different
knowledge, skills, information, and tool kits. Building a team with diverse
perspectives and knowledge steers clear of the constitutional challenges Justice
Alito raised while empowering the best composite team.
To be sure, there are a number of MDLs in which normative claims about
representation, fairness, and social legitimacy may make identity diversity among
leaders key-mass torts over trans-vaginal mesh, Mirena, Yasmin/Yaz, Essure,
NuvaRing, and OrthoEvra all come to mind." Gender can matter where gender
itself is an issue as it is in these proceedings. 2 But identity diversity proponents
often argue that diversity likewise improves outcomes. Here, studies are mixed,
with some suggesting that when people perceive themselves as belonging to
opposing groups, they may tune each other out and that those with privately held
information may be less inclined to share it for fear of being mocked or socially
ostracized.13

judges to consider "any .

9 FED. R. Clv. P. 23(g)(1)(B3).
10 See Order re Consolidation and Interim Class Counsel at 3, In re Robinhood Outage Litig., No.

20-cv-01626-JD (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2020).
" See Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untanglingthe Causal Effects of Sex on

Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. Sci. 389, 390 (2010) (citing Charles Cameron & Craig Cummings, Diversity
and Judicial Decision Making: Evidencefrom Affirmative Action and Cases in the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 1971-1999 (paper presented at the Crafting and Operating Institutions Conference,

2003)).
12 Jenifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmakingin the Federal
Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005).
13 Marie-$lene Roberge & Rolf van Dick, Recognizing the Benefits of Diversity: When and How
Does Diversity Increase Group Performance?, 20 HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 295, 297 (2010)

(citing studies).
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The evidence is more straightforward when researchers consider cognitive
diversity. Cognitively diverse groups consistently see "bonuses" when group
members perform disjunctive, nonroutine, thought-provoking tasks like
brainstorming legal strategy or identifying which issues to appeal.' 4 And, as we
shall see, cognitive diversity and identity diversity can overlap.
Busy judges looking for quick guidance on these matters may find the
appendix to Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation useful.15 It contains a Pocket
Guide for Leadership Appointment and Compensation, a Leadership Application
Form, a Leadership Applicant Scoring Sheet, and sample orders for suggesting
remand and replacing leaders.1 6 And those looking for more detail on the ideas
summarized here can look to the original works from which I excerpted this
article."
I.

CURRENT LEADERSHIP SELECTION METHODS

To prevent the chaos that would ensue if all the plaintiffs' lawyers pooled
together in an MDL tried to litigate their cases simultaneously, MDL judges
appoint a handful of leaders to do all manner of things from coordinating and
conducting discovery to negotiating settlements.' 8 But the plaintiffs themselves
have no say in whom the judge chooses; they cannot fire leaders even if leaders
ignore their interests, and plaintiffs regain decision-making control only in the
unlikely event that their case is remanded to their court of origin.
To pick leaders, some judges defer to plaintiffs' attorneys' "consensus"
slates, where lawyers hash out leadership questions among themselves. Others
conduct an open application process and formally select leaders based on
attorneys' experience, financial resources, and cooperative tendencies-factors
that favor repeat players.1 9 The consensus method, too, favors insiders: "[T]he
'good ol' boy' network of intertwined law firms has sought to capture the case and
exclude all but the usual cast of characters," explained plaintiffs' attorney Wayne
Travell.20

" SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS,

SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES xiv-xv, 325-27

(paperback ed., 2007).

"5 See Burch, Monopolies in MDL Litigation, supra note 2, at 156-66.

16 See id at 160-66.
17 See ELIZABETH

CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT

LITIGATION (Cambridge University Press 2019) [hereinafter BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS]; Elizabeth

Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social
Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445 (2017); Burch, Monopolies in MDL Litigation, supra note 2;
Burch, Judging MDL Litigation, supra note 4.
" One study on all MDLs (not just products liability) suggested that "many" orders left leadership
duties undefined. David L. Noll, What Do MDL Leaders Do? Evidencefrom LeadershipAppointment

Orders, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 433, 464 (2020).
19 Burch & Williams, supra note 17, at 1460-63.
20 The Williams Plaintiffs' Group's Response to Other Parties' Application to Serve on Plaintiff's
Steering Committee at 1, In re Lumber Liquidators Chinese-Manufactured Flooring Prods. Mktg,

Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-md-02627 (E.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2015).
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Regardless of the method, however, outside of class actions, few MDL
judges focus on adequate representation, preferring to leave those ideals to
disempowered individual lawyers.2 1 Yet, the Federal Judicial Center's 2004
Manualfor Complex Litigation recognizes that leadership "[c]ommittees are most
commonly needed when group members' interests and positions are sufficiently
dissimilar to justify giving them representation in decision making."2 2 It suggests
courts consider "whether designated counsel fairly represent the various interests
in the litigation" and, "where diverse interests exist," "designate a committee of
counsel representing different interests., 2
Moreover, emphasizing cooperation (one of the factors judges do use) can
dampen the advantage that insiders' experience confers and further imperil
adequate representation; when cooperation is paramount, it may foster a need for
attorneys to curry favor with one another to secure lucrative positions in future
leadership hierarchies. Attorneys who disrupt the status quo or challenge those in
power are unlikely to find themselves with support from other lawyers in new
MDL beauty contests or consensus slates.
Emphasizing cooperation thus deters dissent by implicitly labeling it as
something that should not be rewarded. Yet, dissent can be pivotal in protecting
plaintiffs' diverse interests. With a statutory requirement that MDL cases share
only a single, common question of fact, plaintiffs' best interests are unlikely to
be uniform. Considering adequate representation in selecting leaders and
permitting dissent from non-leaders are crucial safeguards. As psychology
Professor Charlan Nemeth explains, when people are afraid to speak up, "[s]ilence
then becomes part of the power of the majority."25 But, "[j]ust one person
challenging the consensus can break that power and increase our ability to think
independently and resist moving to erroneous judgments.",2 6
IIL. THE DEBATE OVER REPEAT PLAYERS
As courts favor those with pre-existing leadership experience, they tend to
empower high-level repeat players. In Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation:
The Social Network, my co-author Margaret Williams and I offered the first (and
only) empirical investigation of private plaintiff and defense attorneys' leadership
appointments and their effects in MDL." We found that MDL judges regularly

21

Burch & Williams, supra note 17, at 1460-63.

22 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §§ 10.221, 10.224 (2004) ("[B]ecause appointment
of designated counsel will alter the usual dynamics of client representation in important ways,
attorneys will have legitimate concerns that their clients' interests be adequately represented.").
23

Id § 10.224.

28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
IN DEFENSE OF TROUBLEMAKERS: THE POWER OF DISSENT IN LIFE AND BUSINESS
29-32 (2018).
26 Id at 39.
27 Burch & Williams, supra note 17, at 1470. One later study on all MDLs (not just products liability)
24

25 CHARLANNEMETH,

suggested that "many" orders left leadership duties undefined, which is likewise troubling. David L.
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appoint the same lead attorneys: on the plaintiffs' side, repeat players held 62.8%
of available leadership positions, with a mere fifty attorneys occupying nearly 30%
of all plaintiff-side leadership; on the defense side, where leadership appointments
are rarer, the same defense firms nevertheless occupied 82.3% of all leadership
roles. 28
We used social-network analysis to reveal repeat actors' connections to
one another.2 9 No matter what measure of centrality we used, a key group of only
five high-level repeat players (Richard Arsenault, Daniel Becnel, Jr., Dianne Nast,
Jerrold Parker, and Christopher Seeger) consistently occupied the most powerful
positions, and they seemed to have far more impact on settlement design than did
the total number of repeat players. 30 This matters considerably because lead
lawyers control the proceeding and negotiate settlements, 3' freeing them to bargain
for what matters to them most: defendants want closure and finality, and plaintiffs'
lawyers want to recover for their clients and receive high fee awards along the
way.32 Lead attorneys with few clients can benefit considerably from commonbenefit fees-taxes imposed on plaintiffs' individual attorneys for work that
benefits the collective.
Whether courts' reliance on repeat players is a net positive or negative
33
development, however, has been the subject of much debate. On one hand, repeat
players' experience can generate positive developments that further pretrial
efficiency. 34 They can capitalize on economies of scale, acquired knowledge and
expertise, and benefit from a ready-made infrastructure (from discovery vendors
to claims administrators).35 Certain firms are known to intensively investigate their
cases before suing, and their decision to sue, along with their reputation, may
encourage others to recruit clients and prompt claims to settle more quickly than
they otherwise might. 36 With previous intel about settlement values, insiders may

&

Noll, What Do MDL Leaders Do? Evidence from Leadership Appointment Orders, 24 LEWIS
CLARK L. REv. 433, 464 (2020).
28 Burch & Williams, supra note 17, at 1470-72.
29 Id at 1530.
30 See id at 1496.
31 Id at 1445.
32 Id
33 Compare Burch & Williams, supra note 17 (empirically examining data on repeat play and
concluding "[b]ased on the evidence available to us, we found reason to be concerned that when
repeat players influence the practices and norms that govern multidistrict proceedings-when they
"play for rules," so to speak-the rules they develop may principally benefit them at the expense of

one-shot plaintiffs"), with Bradt & Rave, supra note 2 ("Although the risks they pose are real, we
argue that repeat players add significant value when they represent one-shotter plaintiffs, and that
value may be worth running the risks.").
"

35

Burch, Monopolies in MDL Litigation, supra note 2, at 85-86.
ld

36 ld
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also help insulate clients from defense attempts to wield information asymmetries
against them. 37
On the other hand, concerns about repeat players can be broken into three
categories. First, cronyism among a tight-knit bar that competes for the lucrative
common-benefit fees that accompany leadership roles suggests that insiders are
unlikely to dissent even if doing so is in their clients' best interests-at least if it
undermines insiders' ability to play the long game. Although my off-the-record
conversations with MDL attorneys suggest threats of social and financial sanctions
are prevalent, those occurrences are nevertheless difficult to assess quantitatively.
The best evidence is silence. Objectors rarely speak up during leadership selection,
even though being chosen generates significant fees above and beyond what a
lawyer receives from her own clients. Nor do most attorneys object when lead
lawyers ask the judge to increase their common-benefit fees midway through the
litigation, even though it reduces individual attorneys' profits. 38
Second, when the same plaintiffs' attorneys work with the same defense
attorneys time and again, self-dealing concerns can arise. Scholars like Jack Coffee
have long observed that repeat play tends to regress our adversarial system from
its confrontational roots toward a state of cooperation. 39 And Professor Jerome
Skolnick has explained, when both sides work together routinely, those
relationships can become problematic when they reach a "tipping point where
cooperation may shade off into collusion, thereby subverting the ethical basis of
the system."40
In our study, Margaret Williams and I examined the publicly available
MDL settlements that repeat players designed and we identified settlement
provisions that one might argue principally benefit those insiders.4 ' Considering
deals struck over a fourteen-year period, we were unable to find any that did not
feature at least one closure provision for defendants, and likewise found that nearly
all settlements contained some provision that increased lead plaintiffs' lawyers'
common-benefit fees.42
Perhaps most telling was that in 88.8 percent of the settlements, plaintiffs'
leadership negotiated some aspect of their own common-benefit attorney's fee
directly with the defendant. 4 3 Bargaining for attorneys' fees with one's opponent
is a troubling departure from conventional contingent-fee principles, which are

3 Samuel Issacharoff& John Fabian Witt, The InevitabilityofAggregate Settlement: An Institutional
Account ofAmerican Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1571, 1599-1600 (2005).
38 While 36.6 percent of the proceedings in our study included at least one objection, that number is

somewhat misleading, for the most objectors were either lead lawyers complaining about commonbenefit fund allocations or attorneys concerned about taxing state cases. Burch, Monopolies in MDL

Litigation, supra note 2, at 108.
" See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L.
REv. 1343, 1366 (1995).
40 Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52,69 (1967).
4' Burch & Williams, supra note 17, at 1445.
42

Id

4

Burch, Monopolies in MDL Litigation, supra note 2, at 108.
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supposed to tie lawyers' fees to their clients' outcome.44 When a defendant controls
what opposing counsel is paid, "the defendant can offer 'red-carpet treatment on
fees' in return for favorable terms elsewhere," note Professors Charlie Silver and
Geoffrey Miller.4 5 Yet, in nonclass MDLs, these exchanges receive no formal
judicial review, nor is there a built-in process for objecting. Thus, based on the
evidence available to us, we worry that when repeat players influence the practices
and norms that govern MDLs, the rules they create and perpetuate may principally
benefit them-at the expense of one-shot plaintiffs. 46
Third and related, repeat players raise concerns about whether they will
optimally represent plaintiffs' diverse interests. This broaches the subject of
outcomes and how plaintiffs fare in MDLs, but unfortunately, data on who receives
what (and why) is scarce in both class actions and nonclass MDLs. We did,
however, find one illustration for which payout data was available-Propulsid.
Propulsid appears representative of other deals: it was the earliest publicly
available settlement in our dataset and its steering committee declared that it would
be replicating its model in all future MDLs.4 7 We were able to demonstrate that
settlement designers did indeed incorporate some aspect of that deal in every
subsequent settlement within the data. 48
In Propulsid, 6,012 plaintiffs dismissed their lawsuit to enter into the
settlement program.4 9 But only thirty-seven of them (0.6 percent) recovered any
money through the rigorous physician-controlled settlement process, and
collectively they received little more than $6.5 million. 50 Propulsid'slead lawyers
negotiated their common-benefit fees directly with Johnson & Johnson (the
defendant), receiving $27 million.5' The bulk of the $84-$105 million settlement
fund then reverted back to Johnson & Johnson. 2
In sum, while repeat players can offer plenty of upside through expertise
and knowledge, concerns about self-dealing and adequate representation plague
MDLs. Few checks exist to police these potential pitfalls-appeals are rare in

4lBurch

& Williams, supra note 17, at 1445.

41 Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-ClassAction Method ofManagingMulti-District
Litigations: Problemsand a Proposal,63 VAND. L. REv. 107, 133 (2010).

4 Burch & Williams, supra note 17, at 1445.
47 Propulsid'sleaders stated:
Never before in the history of multidistrict litigation, have counsel achieved a global
resolution of this proportion in the unique manner by which this Settlement Program

resolves the litigation without resort to complex joinder devices or Class Certification.
This remarkable approach to resolution of 'mass tort' litigation promises to become the
template for similar resolution of future litigations of this kind.

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Steering Committees Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees
and Reimbursement of Costs at 1, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. May
3, 2005).
48 Burch & Williams, supra note 17, at 1508.
49 BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 17, at 2.
so

Id

1 See id at 39.
" Id at 39 (providing details on where the money went). For more information on common-benefit

fees, both in Propulsidand in other MDLs, see id at 35-42, 187-207.
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MDL, and in nonclass proceedings, judges do not approve settlements as fair,
reasonable, and adequate. Without formal counterweights and accountability, the
costs to appointing a leadership roster comprised principally of repeat players seem
to outweigh the benefits.
IV. CHOOSING WISELY: A RECOMMENDED APPROACH TO
LEADERSHIP SELECTION.
Looking beyond the usual suspects raises the need to diversify the
leadership roster-but how? What traits should courts value and what procedures
best effectuate those values? This final section recommends procedural techniques
that are likely to diversify the applicant pool, proposes specific questions to ask
applicants to empanel a cognitively diverse team that best represents a
heterogenous group of plaintiffs, and concludes with methods for harnessing the
benefits of outsider dissent as a failsafe.
The touchstone for any appointment that usurps a plaintiffs chosen
counsel should be whether appointed counsel will adequately represent her
designated constituency, whether it is the whole group or some subset thereof. 53 In
class actions, due process requires separate representation when structural conflicts
of interest exist.54 Structural conflicts are those that "present a significant risk that
the lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct of the litigation
so as to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned
evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-a-vis
the lawyers themselves."5 5
Nonclass MDLs should demand no less. Judges routinely empower a few
to speak on behalf of many: negotiating global settlements, developing and
executing a discovery strategy, responding to Daubertand preemption motions,
and designating bellwether trials all impact each plaintiff, and each requires
adequate representation. Otherwise, attorney self-interest and investment strategy
may mean sacrificing the interests of the minority for those of the majority. Thus,
when structural conflicts exist between plaintiffs within a given proceeding, each
group should have its own voice at the leadership table.
A. Procedural Techniques
Appointing temporary counsel and giving the litigation a few months to
develop before selecting leaders may give judges a better idea as to the potential
5 Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
54 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627; In re Literary Works in Electr. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d
242, 252 (2d Cir. 2011).
55 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a)(1)(B); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627.
Separate representation matters less in certain leadership positions, like liaison counsel. Liaison
counsel disseminates information and acts more as a conduit than a decision maker. But adequate
representation is critically important in conducting discovery, choosing bellwether cases, and
negotiating settlement.
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fault lines between plaintiffs. Waiting can also expand the leadership applicant
pool. Researchers at the Federal Judicial Center found that super repeat players
who appeared in thirty or more MDLs tend to enter a proceeding an average of
seventy-three days after centralization, whereas most attorneys do not appear until
an average of 419 days post-centralization. 56 This gives insiders the upper hand
early on because judges often select leaders quickly.
Although it requires more time, courts should employ a competitive
process to select lead lawyers rather than rely on consensus slates or even
57
competitive processes that resemble de facto popularity contests. Application
forms can be tailored for specific positions to solicit wide-ranging information on
pertinent data points, shifting the inquiry away from whether attorneys will all play
well together in the sandbox, and toward whether they offer diverse skills and
knowledge.58 For example, it is helpful for judges to know applicants' involvement
with past (and concurrent) proceedings, including their leadership roles, work
performed, the type of proceeding, the overall outcomes, their clients' outcomes,
and their common-benefit fee requests versus their common-benefit recovery. That
information conveys whether the applicant has time to devote to the new
proceeding, how well her clients fared in previous suits, how much compensation
the lawyer or firm received for past leadership service, and her experiencebearing in mind that many attorneys can have experience in the MDL trenches
even if they have never been given a leadership opportunity. In some respects,
these questions also serve as an indicator of client care. In the trans-vaginal mesh
litigation, for instance, some firms took on an excess of 5,000 clients-a volume
that made it impossible for them to complete discovery on those cases, much less
prepare them for trial. 59
For the proceeding at hand, applicants should identify the injuries and
claims of their firm's current clients, likely conflicts that will arise among the
plaintiffs, financing arrangements (in camera), and any relationships they or their
60
This type of
firm have with third-party vendors or third-party funders.
information prompts attorneys to consider possible conflicts among their clientele,
take care to gain informed consent, and take steps to safeguard the rights of clients
in a minority position. It likewise unearths potential conflicts between attorneys

56

Margaret S. Williams, Emery G. Lee III & Catherine R. Borden, Repeat Players in Federal

Multidistrict Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 141, 166-67 (2012).
" In Volkswagen, the court used a competitive selection process requesting the traditional criteria,
but allowed applicants to indicate others' support. In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Mktg., Sales

Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 15-md-02672-CRB (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (Pretrial
Order No. 2). Those selected essentially won the popularity contest with the support of sixty-seven
other lawyers. BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 17, at 93.
8 For a sample form, see Burch, Monopolies in MDL Litigation,supra note 2, at 162-64.
9 Letter from Shanin Specter to Rebecca A. Womeldorf on Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
on
Multidistrict
Litigation,
Dec.
18,
2020,

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/20-cv-hhsuggestionfrom_shaninspecter_-

mdls_0.pdf.
60 For a sample leadership application form and scoring sheet, see Burch, Monopolies in MDL

Litigation, supranote 2, at 162-64.
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and outsiders, from funders to discovery service providers, to claims
administrators.
Finally, applicants should disclose any skills or traits that might uniquely
situate them to serve in a leadership role. Perhaps they are the attorney who
discovered the defective product in an individual lawsuit, maybe they were a
doctor or nurse in a previous professional life, or perhaps they have personal
connections to the suit in some way. The list here is limitless and distinguished
only by the characteristics of the particular lawsuit. But the idea, as explored
below, is to create a team with members whose talents and knowledge make them
uniquely situated to spearhead a particular proceeding.
B. Leadership Traits
The case for diversifying leadership appointments is multifaceted. There
are, of course, strong moral arguments for including women and persons of color.
Among other important lessons, the Black Lives Matter movement has
demonstrated the need for equal opportunity and equal treatment in a sustainable
democracy. And then there are the business arguments, with some workforce
studies showing that diverse teams can outperform non-diverse teams 6' and others
showing more mixed results. 62
Whatever the rationale, the best leadership group for any proceeding is
unlikely to be a collection of the most experienced, white-haired men who have
enjoyed the role in the past. It's not that experience isn't important-it is-it is just
not the only thing that's important. Think of it this way: when likeminded folks
approach a problem in the same manner, they are likely to get stuck at the same
point. 63 But a group with members who have unique tools and skills, who frame
the problem differently, might solve it in a way that no one else considered. 64
When courts consider applications, they should aim to compile the best
team-not the best individual lawyers. In doing so, they should keep size and skills
in mind. As to size, even though some circumstances will demand larger groups,
empirical studies consistently show that from a decision-making standpoint,
groups with five or six members are optimal. 65 As to skills, the goal is to appoint a
small, cognitively diverse group whose members possess different information
(aligning with clients' diverse interests and injuries), knowledge, and tools. Just as
teams of doctors need skeptics to make accurate diagnoses and successful
corporate boards require assertive members who are not overly deferential to the

61 Dieter Holger, The Business Case for More Diversity, WALL

ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2019, 9:00AM),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-business-case-for-more-diversity-

11572091200?st-4b7yskwxgyn6gx1&reflink=article_email_share; David Rock& Heidi Grant, Why
Diverse Teams Are Smarter, HARv. Bus. REv., June 26, 2019.
62

Roberge & van Dick, supra note 13.

63 See PAGE, supra note 14, at
64

157.

See id

65 Susan A. Wheelan, Group Size, Group Development, andGroup Productivity,40 SMALL GRP. RES.

247, 257-58 (2009, No. 2).
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CEO, 66 leadership groups in MDL need lawyers with mixed perspectives who are
not afraid to openly disagree on matters of substance.
As noted, there has been a recent push for judges to appoint more women
and minorities to leadership positions. 67 But gender, race, age, physical abilities,
economic status, and sexual orientation are all types of identity (or descriptive)
diversity. Cognitive diversity, on the other hand, considers whether people have
diverse knowledge and expertise stemming from training, experiences, and, yes,
identity.6 8 Identity can play a role by creating experiential differences that prompt
contrasting analytic tools to develop 69 even though physical characteristics alone
may tell us little. 70
As Professor Scott Page explains, "by mapping people into identity
groups," "we lump a recent immigrant from Nairobi, Kenya, a grandson of a
sharecropper from the Mississippi delta, and the daughter of a dentist from
1
Barrington, Illinois, into the same category: African Americans."7 We also "place
the granddaughter of a miner from Copper Harbor, Michigan, a son of Gloria
Vanderbilt (that would be Anderson Cooper), and a recently married former au
72
pair from Lithuania into the box labeled non-Hispanic white." But each lump, if
73
disaggregated, would prove cognitively diverse.
As best they can then, judges should strive to compile cognitively diverse
leadership teams by seeking members whose knowledge, skills, information, and
tools differ. 74 Although soliciting and assessing the relevant information I
identified earlier gets judges closer to the mark, assembling a cognitively diverse
group is not an exact science. It involves a bit of guesswork and warrants added
safeguards:
C. Harnessing Dissent
Newcomers with relevant expertise "may be a rich source of ideas for
improving group performance," explain psychologists, because they "lack strong
personal ties to other members that inhibit their willingness to challenge group
orthodoxy," are not already "committed to the group's task strategy," and "bring

66 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: How LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE,

147-48 (2009);

Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Boards Great, HARV. Bus. REV. (Sept. 2002).
67 See Chapoco, supranote 6; Frankel, supra note 6.
68 PAGE, supra note 14, at 7-8, 302-12; Elizabeth Mannix & Margaret A. Neale, What Differences
Make a Diference?: The Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organizations,6 AM. PSYCHOL.

Soc' Y 31, 41-42 (2005).
See Abby L. Mello & Lisa A. Delise, Cognitive Diversity to Team Outcomes: The Roles of
Cohesion and Conflict Management, 46 SMALL GRP. REs. 204, 204-05 (2015).
70 See id
71 PAGE, supra note 14, at 363.
69

72

Id

?3

Id. at 364.

?4 These criteria are linked to adequate representation and thus avoid the constitutional challenge that

Justice Alito raised to race and gender-based appointments in class actions. See Martin v. Blessing,
571 U.S. 1040, 1042 (2013).
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fresh perspectives gained in other groups." 75 Yet, given the lengthy nature of many
MDLs and the fact that heterogeneous groups can lose their edge as their thinking
converges with repeated interaction, there is value in building in additional
protections. 76
The key-as uncomfortable and irritating as it may be-is to appoint a mix
of cognitively diverse people, all with the relevant expertise and skills (but perhaps
some with less leadership experience) and prize dissent. Permit and embrace it at
every turn.
Dissenters can add value in three ways. First, they unravel the power of a
majority's consensus and subject it to scrutiny and questioning.7 7 Second, they
stimulate divergent thinking. For example, studies on juries show that when there
is a dissenter present and jurors must deliberate until they reach a consensus, they
consider more evidence, explanations, and alternative possibilities. 78 Finally,
dissenters may introduce (and prompt others to divulge) new information. As
psychologists Charlan Nemeth and Jack Goncalo-two of the world's leading
experts on group decisions-explain, minority views are critical "not because they
may be correct but because even when they are wrong they stimulate thinking that
on balance leads to better decisions. It stops the rush to judgment by providing a
counter to the majority view." 79 Put simply, dissent staves off hastened judgment,
prompts majorities to seek multiple problem-solving strategies, stimulates original
thinking, and can encourage more creative solutions to emerge.80
MDL judges can find dissent from two sources: (1) cognitively diverse
leaders who represent subgroups with structurally conflicting interests, and (2)
outsiders, the bevy of nonlead lawyers on the sidelines who have much to lose or
gain for their clients. As plaintiffs' aims and preferences vary, dissenters can
challenge the status quo and inject previously undisclosed information into the
discussion. Still, it helps to be specific about who is in charge of raising concerns
on behalf of certain plaintiffs. This is where subgrouping for structural conflicts
can help tremendously. When groups fail to elicit and use all of the information
that each member holds privately, it is often because no one sees himself or herself
as the designated expert.81

5 John M. Levine & Hoon-Seok Choi, Minority Influence in Interacting Groups: The Impact of
Newcomers, in REBELS IN GROUPS 73, 78 (Jolanda Jetten & Matthew J. Hornsey eds., 2011).
76 PAGE, supra note 14, at 157.
77 NEMETH, supra note 25, at 29-32, 39.
78 Charlan Nemeth, Jury Trials: Psychology and the Law, in 14 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, 309 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1981).
79 Charlan J. Nemeth & Jack A. Goncalo, Rogues and Heroes: Finding Value in Dissent, in REBELS
IN GROUPS: DISSENT, DEVIANCE, DIFFERENCE, AND DEFIANCE 17, 23 (Jolanda Jetten & Matthew J.
Hornsey eds., 2010).
80 Id at 22; Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Dissent as a Facilitator:Individual- and Group-Level Effects
on Creativity and Performance, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS
149, 150-54, 162-63 (Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Michele J. Gelfand eds., 2008).
8I See Garold Stasser & William Titus, Hidden Profiles: A BriefHistory, 14 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 304,
310 (2003).
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The goal is not to empower a bunch of cantankerous contrarians whose
interpersonal conflict brings the group to a standstill. Rather, it is to foster dissent
and debate over how to best approach the complex, novel legal issues that face
judges and lawyers alike in MDLs. On critical issues, welcoming conflict from
insiders on leadership committees as well as outsiders by opening the docket to
supplemental briefing or disagreement allows judges to harness dissent's value:
82
more information, more critical thinking, and more representation.

V. CONCLUSION
Selecting cognitively diverse leaders and welcoming dissent and the
information that it generates allows judges to build in additional safeguards for
plaintiffs-many of whom receive little contact from their chosen attorneys.
Judges may be the last line of defense, but if they are not armed with the facts, they
are handicapped. Incentivizing those who hold that information-other plaintiffs'
attorneys-to disclose it, wield it to their clients' benefit, and hold leaders
accountable is crucial.

82 See Nemeth & Goncalo, supra note 79, at 27-28.

